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Abstract
This paper deals with the problem of efficient resource allocation in dynamic infrastructureless
wireless networks. Assuming a reactive interference-limited scenario, each transmitter is allowed to select
one frequency channel (from a common pool) together with a power level at each transmission trial;
hence, for all transmitters, not only the fading gain, but also the number of interfering transmissions and
their transmit powers are varying over time. Due to the absence of a central controller and time-varying
network characteristics, it is highly inefficient for transmitters to acquire global channel and network
knowledge. Therefore a reasonable assumption is that transmitters have no knowledge of fading gains,
interference, and network topology. Each transmitting node selfishly aims at maximizing its average
reward (or minimizing its average cost), which is a function of the action of that specific transmitter as
well as those of all other transmitters. This scenario is modeled as a multi-player multi-armed adversarial
bandit game, in which multiple players receive an a priori unknown reward with an arbitrarily time-
varying distribution by sequentially pulling an arm, selected from a known and finite set of arms. Since
players do not know the arm with the highest average reward in advance, they attempt to minimize their
so-called regret, determined by the set of players’ actions, while attempting to achieve equilibrium in
some sense. To this end, we design in this paper two joint power level and channel selection strategies.
We prove that the gap between the average reward achieved by our approaches and that based on the
best fixed strategy converges to zero asymptotically. Moreover, the empirical joint frequencies of the
game converge to the set of correlated equilibria. We also characterize this set for two special cases
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2of our designed game. We further discuss experimental regret-testing procedure as another potential
solution, which converges to Nash equilibrium. Finally all approaches are compared through extensive
numerical analysis.
Index Terms
Adversarial bandits, channel selection, equilibrium, infrastructureless wireless network, power con-
trol.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Bandit Theory and Wireless Communication
Multi-armed bandit (MAB) is a class of sequential optimization problems, to the best of our
knowledge originally introduced in [1]. In the most traditional form of MAB, given a set of arms
(actions), a player pulls an arm at each trial of the game to receive a reward. The rewards of arms
are not known to the player in advance; however, upon pulling an arm, its instantaneous reward
is revealed. In such unknown setting, after playing an arm, the player may lose some reward (or
incur additional cost) due to not playing another arm instead of the currently played arm. This
can be quantified by the difference between the reward that would have been achieved had the
player selected another arm, and the reward of the played arm. This quantity is called regret.
The player decides which arm to pull in a sequence of trials so that its accumulated regret over
the game horizon is minimized. Such problems obviously render the intrinsic trade-off between
exploration (learning) and exploitation (control), i.e. playing the arm which has exhibited the
best performance in the past and playing other arms to guarantee the optimal payoff in future.
An important class of bandit games is adversarial bandits, where the series of rewards generated
by an arm cannot be attributed to any specific distribution function.
In recent years, bandit theory has been used in communication theory. For instance, [2] and
[3] utilize the classical bandit game to model spectrum sharing in cognitive radio networks. In
[4], the authors propose a cooperative spectrum sensing scheme based on bandit theory. Further,
References [5], [6], and [7] use bandit theory to model relay selection, sensor scheduling and
object tracking, respectively. Channel monitoring using bandit model is investigated in [8] and
[9]. Bandit models have been also used to solve the distributed resource allocation problem, as
discussed in the following.
3B. Distributed Resource Allocation in Infrastructureless Wireless Networks
In recent years, game theory and reinforcement learning have been widely used to solve
the distributed resource allocation problem. The vast majority of game-theoretic approaches
are based on either cooperation (e.g. coalition formation), mechanism design (e.g. auction the-
ory), or exchange economy (e.g. supply-demand markets). Although these approaches can be
implemented in a distributed manner, such an implementation in a real network environment
requires that each player at least knows its own utility function a priori. On the other hand, these
approaches are in general inefficient as players have to exchange information for coordination,
which increases signaling and feedback overhead. For example, most models from cooperative
game theory require coordination and/or communication among players to construct coalitions
[10], [11]. In wireless resource allocation using auction games, bids must be submitted to some
central controller that performs necessary computations and makes decisions [12], [13]. Finally,
in supply-demand market models, prices and demands are exchanged among buyers and sellers
[14], [15].
When the utility functions are not known in advance, the resource allocation problem is often
solved by using learning approaches, including bandit models. A large body of literature, such
as [16], [17] and [18], analyze single-agent stochastic learning problems. Another example is
[19]. In this work, network optimization is modeled as a stochastic bandit game, where at each
trial multiple arms are selected by a single player and the reward is some linear combination of
the rewards of selected arms. An application of this formulation might be a downlink user
selection, performed by the base station. In single-agent settings, the agent learns from its
previous experiences, and no information flow is required. However, this type of learning cannot
generally be used in wireless networks, where multiple players act selfishly by responding to
each other and their utilities are influenced by the actions of other players. Moreover, similar to
games with complete information, it is desired that players achieve equilibrium in some sense. As
for multi-agent settings, most studies assume that players are able to observe the actions of each
other. This assumption, despite being realistic for some spectrum sharing problems, is not always
applicable to general resource allocation problems, especially in power control games, where it
is difficult to identify the transmit power level of players. In addition, the assumption that each
player announces its actions (e.g. its transmit power) is not intensive compatible. As a result, a
4great majority of previous works focus on spectrum sharing and/or sensing, as well as channel
monitoring. On the other hand, most of previous studies assume that the rewards achieved by
each action can be attributed to a single density distribution. However this assumption is highly
restrictive especially for dynamic networks.
In [20], multi-agent bandit problem is investigated. This study assumes that in case of interfer-
ence, no reward is paid to interfering users, thereby eliminating interference, which degrades the
overall performance depending on utility functions. In addition, communication among players
is necessary. Finally, no equilibrium analysis is performed. Another example is Reference [21],
where opportunistic spectrum access is formulated as a multi-agent learning game. In this work,
upon availability, each channel pays the same reward to all users so that this scenario is strictly
restrictive as it neglects different channel qualities. Moreover, if a channel is selected by multiple
users, orthogonal spectrum access scheme is used, which is known to be sub-optimal in general.
References [22] and [23] consider graphical games for an interference minimization problem
with partially overlapping channels, where the interference is present only between neighboring
users. These works establish the convergence of proposed learning approaches for the special
case of exact potential games; Nonetheless the analysis does not hold for more general games.
The authors of [24] model the cooperative rate maximization in cognitive radio networks as
bandit game, and propose two approaches, depending on the availability of information. The
stability of the solution is however not investigated. Reference [25] proposes two approaches that
achieve Nash equilibrium in a multi-player cognitive environment. System verification, however,
is only based on numerical approaches. References [26], [27] and [28] propose various selection
schemes to achieve logarithmic regret; however, no equilibrium analysis is performed. All of the
works named above assume that the generated rewards of any given action are independent and
identically distributed.
C. Our Contribution
As discussed in Section I-B, the resource allocation problem using machine learning theory has
been subject to extensive research in recent years. In short, our focus is on a resource allocation
problem in an infrastructureless network. First, we model this problem as an adversarial multi-
player multi-armed bandit game. With the aim of an efficient management of network resources
and the co-channel interference mitigation, we follow an approach suggested in [29] to design
5two joint power control and channel selection (PC-CS, hereafter) strategies, which are adapted
versions of exponential-based weighted average [30] and follow the leader [31] strategies. Both
PC-CS strategies not only result in small (that is, with sublinear growth rate in time) regret
for each individual player, but also guarantee the convergence of empirical frequencies of play
to the set of correlated equilibria. We further characterize this set for two special cases of our
designed game. Moreover, we implement the experimental regret-testing procedure [32], which
is shown to converge to the set of Nash equilibria of the game.
Our work extends the state-of-the-art in this area significantly since it differs from the existing
studies in the following crucial aspects:
• We analyze the multi-agent bandit problem and take into account the selfishness of players.
• We do not assume that the reward generating process of any given action is time-invariant. In
fact, the reward functions are allowed to vary arbitrarily, which enables us to accommodate
the dynamic nature of wireless channels and distributed networks.
• We do not allow any communication among players, thereby minimizing the overhead.
Moreover, players do not observe the actions of each other, so that the developed model can
be applied to a large body of resource allocation problems. An example is a power control
problem with unknown power levels used by other players. We study a two-dimensional
problem, namely joint channel and power level selection problem, by modeling it as a multi-
player multi-armed bandit game. In our model, channel qualities are taken into account so
that channels pay different rewards to different users. In addition, we impose no limitations
on interference pattern.
• Our convergence analysis is valid for a wide range of games. This is in contrast to many
previous works where the game should be necessarily potential for the convergence analysis
to hold.
• We characterize the set of correlated equilibria for two special cases of our formulated game
model.
D. Paper Structure
Section II briefly reviews some concepts and results of bandit theory. In Section III the resource
allocation game is formulated. Section IV presents a PC-CS strategy based on exponential-
based weighted average rule [30]. In Section V, another PC-CS strategy, derived from follow
6the leader rule [31] is discussed. Section VI is devoted to experimental regret-testing procedure
[32]. Numerical analysis are presented in Section VII. Section VIII concludes the paper.
II. MULTI-PLAYER MULTI-ARMED BANDIT GAMES
A. Notions of Regret
Multi-player multi-armed bandit problem (MP-MAB, hereafter) is a class of sequential de-
cision making problems with limited information. In this game, each player k ∈ {1, ..., K} is
assigned an action set including Nk actions (arms), 1 ≤ Nk ≤ N . Every player selects an action
at successive trials in order to receive an initially unknown reward, which is determined not
only by its own actions, but also by those of other players. The action set, the played action and
the reward achieved by each player are regarded as private information. The reward generating
processes of arms are independent. Let I and I(k) be the joint action space and the action space
of player k, respectively. Accordingly, It = (I
(1)
t , ..., I
(k)
t , ..., I
(K)
t ) denotes the joint action profile
of players at time t, with I(k)t being the action of player k. Moreover, let g
(k)
t (It) ∈ [0, 1] be the
reward achieved by some player k at time t.1 The instantaneous regret of any player k is defined
as the difference between the reward of the optimal action,2 and that of the played action. Based
on this definition, the cumulative regret of player k is formally defined in the following.
Definition 1. The cumulative regret of player k up to time n is defined as
R(k)n = max
i=1,...,Nk
n∑
t=1
g
(k)
t (i, I
−
t,k)−
n∑
t=1
g
(k)
t (I
(k)
t , I
−
t,k), (1)
where I−t,k is defined to be the joint action profile of all players except for k at time t.
Each player aims at minimizing its accumulated regret, which is an instance of the well-known
exploitation-exploration dilemma: Find a desired balance between exploiting actions that have
exhibited well performance in the past (control) on the one hand, and exploring actions which
might lead to a better performance in the future (learning) on the other hand.
Now, suppose that players use mixed strategies. This means that, at each trial t, player k
selects a probability distribution P(k)t = (p
(k)
1,t , ..., p
(k)
i,t , ..., p
(k)
Nk,t
) over arms, and plays arm i with
1Note that all results can be also expressed in terms of loss (d), provided that the loss is related to the gain by d = 1− g, g ∈
[0, 1].
2Optimality is defined in the sense of the highest instantaneous reward.
7probability p(k)i,t . In this case, we resort to expected regret, also called external regret [33], defined
as follows.
Definition 2. The external cumulative regret of player k is defined as
R
(k)
Ext := R
(k)
Ext(n) = max
i=1,...,Nk
n∑
t=1
g
(k)
t (i, I
−
t,k)−
n∑
t=1
g¯
(k)
t
(
P
(k)
t , I
−
t,k
)
= max
i=1,...,Nk
n∑
t=1
N∑
j=1
p
(k)
j,t
(
g
(k)
t (i, I
−
t,k)− g(k)t (j, I−t,k)
)
,
(2)
where g¯(k)t (·) denotes the expected reward at round t by using mixed strategy P(k)t , defined as
g¯
(k)
t (·) =
∑N
j=1 g
(k)
t (·)p(k)j,t .
By definition, external regret compares the expected reward of the current mixed strategy
with that of the best fixed action in the hindsight, but fails to compare the rewards achieved by
changing actions in a pair-wise manner. In order to compare actions in pairs, internal regret [33]
is introduced that is closely related to the concept of equilibrium in games.
Definition 3. The internal cumulative regret of player k is defined as
R
(k)
Int := R
(k)
Int (n) = max
i,j=1,...,Nk
R
(k)
(i→j),n
= max
i,j=1,...,Nk
n∑
t=1
p
(k)
i,t
(
g
(k)
t
(
j, I−t,k
)− g(k)t (i, I−t,k)) . (3)
Notice that on the right-hand side of (3), r(k)(i→j),t = p
(k)
i,t
(
g
(k)
t (j, ·)− g(k)t (i, ·)
)
denotes the
expected regret caused by pulling arm i instead of arm j. By comparing (2) and (3), external
regret can be bounded above by internal regret as [34]
R
(k)
Ext = max
i=1,...,Nk
Nk∑
j=1
R
(k)
(i→j),n ≤ Nk maxi,j=1,...,NkR
(k)
(i→j),n = NkR
(k)
Int . (4)
Remark 1. Throughout the paper, vanishing (zero-average) external and internal regret means
that limn→∞ 1nRExt = 0 and limn→∞
1
n
RInt = 0, respectively. In other words, we have RExt ∈ o(n)
and RInt ∈ o(n). Note that by (4), RInt ∈ o(n) yields RExt ∈ o(n). Throughout the paper, we call
any strategy with RInt ∈ o(n) as ”no-regret strategy”.
8B. Equilibrium
From the view point of each player k, an MP-MAB is seen as a game with two agents: player
k itself, and the set of all other K − 1 players (referred to as the opponent), whose joint action
profile affects the reward achieved by player k. We consider here the most general framework,
where the opponent is non-oblivious, i.e. its series of actions depends on the actions of player
k. It is known that a game against a non-oblivious opponent can be modeled only by adversarial
bandit games [35], while similar to other game-theoretic formulations, the solution is considered
to be equilibrium, most importantly Nash and correlated equilibria.3
In the context of game-theoretic bandits, an important result is the following theorem.
Theorem 1 ( [33]). Consider a K-player bandit game, where each player k is provided with
an action set of cardinality Nk. Denote the internal regret of player k by R
(k)
Int , and the set of
correlated equilibria by C. At time n, define the empirical joint distribution of the game as
pˆin(i) =
1
n
n∑
t=1
I{It=i}, i = (i(1), ..., i(K)) ∈
K⊗
k=1
{1, ..., NK} . (5)
Then, if all players k ∈ {1, ..., K} play according to any strategy so that
lim
n→∞
1
n
R
(k)
Int = 0, (6)
the distance infpi∈C
∑
i |pˆin(i)− pi(i)| between the empirical joint distribution of plays and the
set of correlated equilibria converges to 0 almost surely.
Theorem 1 simply states that in an MP-MAB game, if all players play according to a strategy
with vanishing internal regret (no-regret), then the empirical joint distribution of plays converges
to the set of correlated equilibria. Note that the strategies used by players are not required to be
identical. Since a rational player is always interested in minimizing its regret, the assumption
that every player plays according to a no-regret strategy is reasonable.
C. From Vanishing External Regret to Vanishing Internal Regret
In [34], an approach is proposed for converting any selection strategy with vanishing external
regret to another version with vanishing internal regret. We describe this approach briefly.
3These definitions are quite standard (see e.g. [36]), and thus we do not restate them here.
9Consider a selection strategy (O-strategy, hereafter) which at each time t assigns probability
distribution Pt to the set of N actions, and selects an action according to this distribution.
Assume that the player starts using O-Strategy with uniform distribution over N actions. At
each time t > 1, the O-strategy has already selected Pt−1 = (p1,t−1, .., pi,t−1, .., pj,t−1, .., pN,t−1).
Now, the O-strategy constructs a meta-strategy (M-strategy, hereafter) with N(N − 1) virtual
strategies based on Pt−1. Each virtual strategy corresponds to a pair of actions (i→ j), (i, j ∈
{1, ..., N} , i 6= j), and constructs a distribution over N actions by assigning the probability mass
of action i to action j. That is, it defines P(i→j)t−1 = (p1,t−1, .., 0, .., pj,t−1 + pi,t−1, .., pN,t−1), which
has 0 and pj,t−1+pi,t−1 at the place of pi,t−1 and pj,t−1, respectively, and all other elements remain
unchanged. Assume that the M-strategy treats these virtual strategies as actions. That is, at each
time t, it defines a probability vector δt over N(N − 1) virtual actions, where the probability
of action (i→ j), i.e. δ(i→j),t, depends on its past performance.4 Now, at time t, the O-strategy
assigns a distribution Pt to N actions, where Pt =
∑
(i,j):i 6=j P
(i→j)
t δ(i→j),t. The constructed O-
strategy has the characteristic that its internal regret is upper-bounded by the external regret of
the M-strategy over N(N−1) virtual actions according to probability δt. Thus, if the M-strategy
exhibits vanishing external regret, the O-strategy results in vanishing internal regret. In Section
IV and V, we use this property to design no-regret selection strategies.
III. BANDIT-THEORETICAL MODEL OF INFRASTRUCTURELESS WIRELESS NETWORKS
We consider a network consisting of K transmitter-receiver pairs, denoted by (k, k′), where
k, k′ ∈ {1, ..., K}. The transmitter-receiver pair (k, k′) is referred to as user or player k. Each
user k can access Ck mutually orthogonal channels at Lk quantized power levels. This implies
that its strategy set includes Nk = Ck×Lk actions, where at time t each action I(k)t = (c(k)t , l(k)t )
consists of one channel index (which corresponds to some channel quality), and one power level.
Therefore, the joint action profile of users, It, is to be understood here as the pair (ct, lt), where
ct = (c
(1)
t , ..., c
(K)
t ) and lt = (l
(1)
t , ..., l
(K)
t ). As each channel might be accessible by multiple users,
co-channel interference (collision, interchangeably) is likely to arise. Since users are allowed to
select a new channel and to adapt their power levels at each transmission trial, interference
pattern in general changes over time. In addition, the distribution of fading coefficients might be
4Note that the gains of virtual actions cannot be calculated explicitly. Later we will see that the gain achieved by any virtual
action (i→ j) is calculated based on the gain achieved by playing true actions i and j.
10
time-varying so that acquiring channel and/or network information at the level of autonomous
transmitters would be extremely challenging and inefficient. Therefore, we assume that
(A1) transmitters have no channel knowledge or any other side information such as the number
of users or their selected actions.
(A2) In addition, users do not coordinate their actions that can be chosen completely asyn-
chronously by each user.
Note that as users do not observe the actions of each other, it might be in their interest to select
their actions at the beginning of trials, thereby using the remaining time for data transmission.
In this paper, we model the joint channel and power level selection problem as a K-player
adversarial bandit game, where player k decides for one of the Nk actions. We define the expected
utility function (reward) of player k to be5
G
(k)
t (I) = log
(
l(k)|hkk′,t,c(k)|2∑Qk
q=1 l
(q)|hqk′,t,c(k) |2 +N0
)
− α · l(k) , (7)
for some given joint action profile I = (c, l). In (7), Qk < K is the number of players that
interfere with user k in channel c(k). Throughout the paper, |huv,t,c|2 ∈ R+ is used to denote the
average gain of channel c between u → v at time t. N0 is the variance of zero-mean additive
white Gaussian noise, and α ≥ 0 is the constant power price factor. The last term in (7) is used
to penalize the use of excessive power. According to Section II, let g(k)t (It) ∈ [0, 1] denote the
achieved reward of player k at time t, as a function of joint action profile It. We consider a
game with noisy rewards where g(k)t (I) = G
(k)
t (I) + t, with  being some zero-mean random
variable with bounded variance, which is independent and identically distributed over time. As it
is well-known, in a non-cooperative game, the primary goal of each selfish player is to maximize
its own accumulated reward. Formally, this can be written as
maximize
(c
(k)
t ,l
(k)
t )
n∑
t=1
g
(k)
t (ct, lt), (8)
where c(k)t ∈ {1, ..., Ck} and l(k)t ∈ {1, ..., Lk}. By Assumptions (A1) and (A2), however, it is
clear that the objective function in (8) is not available. For this reason, we argue for a less
ambitious goal, which is known as regret minimization. More precisely, each player k attempts
5Throughout the paper, logarithms are based 2 unless otherwise is stated.
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to achieve vanishing external regret in the sense that
lim
n→∞
1
n
R
(k)
Ext
= lim
n→∞
1
n
(
max
i=1,...,Nk
n∑
t=1
g
(k)
t (i, I
−
t,k)−
n∑
t=1
g¯
(k)
t (P
(k)
t , I
−
t,k)
)
= 0.
(9)
In addition to the individual strategy of each user aiming at satisfying (9), all players should
achieve some steady state, i.e. equilibrium. Therefore, in the remainder of this paper, we develop
algorithmic solutions to the resource allocation problem with a twofold objective in mind: i)
external regret of each user should vanish asymptotically according to (9) and ii) the actions of
all players should convergence to equilibrium.
By (4), the external regret of each user is upper-bounded by its internal regret. As a result,
if all users select their actions according to some no-regret strategy, not only (9) is achieved by
all of them (see also Remark 1), but also the corresponding game converges to equilibrium in
some sense, which immediately follows from Theorem 1. In Sections IV and V, we present two
internal-regret minimizing strategies that are shown to solve the game and, with it, to achieve the
two objectives mentioned above. Both algorithms can be applied in a fully decentralized manner
by each player, since at each time, they only require the set of past rewards of the respective
player.
Finally, it is worth noting that the set of correlated equilibria for the general time-varying
repeated game defined by (7) cannot be characterized. Nevertheless, in what follows, we char-
acterize this set for two games defined by some relaxed versions of (7). First, consider a game
similar to the one defined above, with the difference that unlike (7), the reward process is assumed
to be stationary, i.e.
G(k)(I) = log
(
l(k)|hkk′,c(k) |2∑Qk
q=1 l
(q)|hqk′,c(k) |2 +N0
)
− α · l(k) , (10)
which implies that the average channel gains are time-invariant. By the following proposition,
this game has a unique correlated equilibrium.
Proposition 1. Consider a K-player game where the expected reward function of each player
k is defined by (10). This game has a unique correlated equilibrium which places probability
one on its unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium.
12
Proof: See Section IX-B.
Now let the expected reward function be defined as follows:
G(k)(I) = log
(
l(k)
|hkk′,c(k)|2
N0
)− αl(k), (11)
which is more restricted, but simpler than (10). With this choice of expected reward function, the
game can be shown to have a unique correlated equilibrium that maximizes the aggregate utility
of all players, i.e. the social welfare. This result is stated formally in the following proposition.
Proposition 2. Consider a K-player game where each player k has the expected reward function
G(k)(·) given by (11). This game has a unique correlated equilibrium which places probability
one on a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium that maximizes
∑K
k=1G
(k)(·).
Proof: See Section IX-C.
IV. NO-REGRET BANDIT EXPONENTIAL-BASED WEIGHTED AVERAGE STRATEGY
The basic idea of an exponential-based weighted strategy is to assign each action, at every trial,
some selection probability which is inversely proportional to exponentially-weighted accumulated
regret (or directly proportional to exponentially-weighted accumulated reward) caused by that
action in the past [37]. Roughly speaking, if playing an action has resulted in large regret in the
past, its future selection probability is small, and vice versa.
As described in Section II-A, in bandit formulation, players only observe the reward of the
played action, and not those of others. Therefore the reward of each action i is estimated as [33]
g˜
(k)
t (i) =

g
(k)
t (I
(k)
t )
p
(k)
i,t
i = I
(k)
t
0 o.w.
, (12)
which is an unbiased estimate of the true reward of action i; that is, Et
[
g˜(k)(i)
]
= g(k)(i).
Estimated rewards are afterwards used to calculate regrets. For example, the regret of not playing
action j instead of action i yields
R˜
(k)
(i→j),t−1 =
t−1∑
s=1
r˜
(k)
(i→j),s =
t−1∑
s=1
p
(k)
i,s (g˜
(k)
s (j)− g˜(k)s (i)). (13)
Despite exhibiting vanishing external regret, weighted average strategies yield in general large
internal regret; as a result, even if all players play according to such strategies, the game does not
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converge to equilibrium. In the following, we utilize the bandit version of exponentially weighted
average strategy [38], and convert it to an improved version that yields small internal regret,
using the approach of Section II-C. The strategy is called no regret bandit exponentially-weighted
average strategy (NR-BEWAS), and is described in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 No-Regret Bandit Exponential-Based Weighted Average Strategy (NR-BEWAS)
1: If the game horizon, n, is known, define γt and ηt as given in Proposition 3, otherwise as those given in
Proposition 4.
2: Define Φ(U) = 1ηt ln
(∑Nk
i=1 exp(ηtui)
)
, where U = (u1, ..., uNk) ∈ RNk .
3: Let P(k)1 =
(
1
Nk
, ..., 1Nk
)
(uniform distribution).
4: Select an action using P(k)1 .
5: Play and observe the reward.
6: for t = 2, ..., n do
7: Let P(k)t−1 be the mixed strategy at time t− 1, i.e. P(k)t−1 =
(
p
(k)
1,t−1, .., p
(k)
i,t−1, .., p
(k)
j,t−1, .., p
(k)
Nk,t−1
)
.
8: Construct P(k),(i→j)t−1 as follows: replace p
(k)
i,t−1 in P
(k)
t−1 by zero, and instead increase p
(k)
j,t−1 to p
(k)
j,t−1+p
(k)
i,t−1.
Other elements remain unchanged. We obtain P(k),(i→j)t−1 =
(
p
(k)
1,t−1, .., 0, .., p
(k)
j,t−1 + p
(k)
i,t−1, .., p
(k)
Nk,t−1
)
.
9: Define
δ
(k)
(i→j),t =
exp
(
ηtR˜
(k)
(i→j),t−1
)
∑
(m→l):m 6=l exp
(
ηtR˜
(k)
(m→l),t−1
) , (14)
where R˜(k)(i→j),t−1 is calculated by using (12) and (13).
10: Given δ(k)(i→j),t, solve the following fixed point equation to find P
(k)
t :
P
(k)
t =
∑
(i→j):i6=j
P
(k),(i→j)
t δ
(k)
(i→j),t. (15)
11: Final probability distribution yields
P
(k)
t = (1− γt)P(k)t +
γt
Nk
. (16)
12: Using the final P(k)t , given by (16), select an action.
13: Play and observe the reward.
14: end for
From Algorithm 1, NR-BEWAS has two parameters, namely γt and ηt. In the event that the
game horizon, n, is known in advance, these two parameters are constant over time (ηt = η and
γt = γ), and the growth rate of regret can be bounded precisely, mainly based on the results of
[33]. Otherwise, they vary with time. In this case, vanishing (sub-linear in time) internal regret
can be guaranteed; nevertheless, this bound might be loose. This discussion is formalized by
following propositions.
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Proposition 3. Let ηt = η =
(
lnNk
2Nkn
) 2
3
and γt = γ =
(
N2k lnNk
4n
) 1
3
. Then Algorithm1 (NR-BEWAS)
yields vanishing internal regret and we have R(k)Int ∈ O((nN2k lnNk)
2
3 ).
Proof: See Appendix IX-D.
Proposition 4. Let ηt =
γ3t
N2k
and γt = t−
1
3 . Then Algorithm 1 (NR-BEWAS) yields vanishing
internal regret; that is we have R(k)Int ∈ o(n).
Proof: See Appendix IX-E.
The following corollaries follow from the above propositions and Theorem 1.
Corollary 1. If all players play according to NR-BEWAS, then the empirical joint frequencies
of play converge to the set of correlated equilibria.
Proof: The proof is a direct consequence of Theorem 1 and Proposition 3 or Proposition
4.
Corollary 2. Let -correlated equilibrium approximate correlated equilibrium in the sense that⋂
>0 C = C. Assuming that the game horizon is known and all players play according to NR-
BEWAS, then the minimum required number of trials to achieve -correlated equilibrium yields
maxk=1,...,K 
− 3
2O ((NkK)(N
2
k lnNk +K
2 lnK)), which is proportional to −
3
2 and increases
polynomially in the number of actions as well as in the number of players.
Proof: The proof follows from the bound of Proposition 3 and Remark 7.6 of [33].6
V. NO-REGRET BANDIT FOLLOW THE PERTURBED LEADER STRATEGY
Similar to the weighted-average strategy presented in the previous section, the strategy follow
the perturbed leader is an approach to solve online decision-making problems. In the basic
version of this approach, called follow the leader [39], the action with the minimum regret in
the past is selected at each trial. However, this method is deterministic and therefore does not
achieve vanishing regret against non-oblivious opponents. Therefore, in follow the perturbed
leader, player adds a random perturbation to the vector of accumulated regrets, and the action
with the minimum perturbed regret in the past is selected [33]. In [40], a bandit version of this
6Details are omitted to avoid unnecessary restatement of existing analysis.
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algorithm is constructed, where unobserved rewards are estimated. The authors show that the
developed algorithm exhibits vanishing external regret. Similar to NR-BEWAS, we here modify
the algorithm of [40] to ensure vanishing internal regret. The approach is called no-regret bandit
follow the perturbed leader strategy (NR-BFPLS).
Algorithm 2 No-Regret Bandit Follow the Perturbed Leader Strategy (NR-BFPLS)
1: Define t = n =
√
lnn
3
√
Nkn
, and γt = min(1, Nkt). Note that unlike NR-BEWAS, here we know the game
horizon (n) in advance.
2: Let P(k)1 =
(
1
Nk
, ..., 1Nk
)
(uniform distribution).
3: Select an action using P(k)1 .
4: Play and observe the reward.
5: for t = 2, ..., n do
6: Let P(k)t−1 be the mixed strategy at time t− 1, i.e. P(k)t−1 =
(
p
(k)
1,t−1, .., p
(k)
i,t−1, .., p
(k)
j,t−1, .., p
(k)
Nk,t−1
)
.
7: Construct P(k),(i→j)t−1 as follows: replace p
(k)
i,t−1 in P
(k)
t−1 by zero, and instead increase p
(k)
j,t−1 to p
(k)
j,t−1+p
(k)
i,t−1.
Other elements remain unchanged. We obtain P(k),(i→j)t−1 =
(
p
(k)
1,t−1, .., 0, .., p
(k)
j,t−1 + p
(k)
i,t−1, .., p
(k)
Nk,t−1
)
.
8: Calculate R˜(k)(i→j),t−1 using (12) and (13).
9: Define σ(i→j),t−1 =
(∑t−1
τ=1
1
δ
(k)
(i→j),t
) 1
2
, which is the upper-bound of conditional variances of random
variables R˜(k)(i→j),t−1 [40].
10: Let R˜(k)(i→j),t−1 = R˜
(k)
(i→j),t−1 −
√
1 +
√
2/Nk σ(i→j),t−1
√
ln(t) [40].
11: Randomly select a perturbation vector µt with Nk(Nk−1) elements from two-sided exponential distribution
with width t.
12: Consider a selection rule which selects the action (i→ j) given by
argmax
{
R˜
(k)
(i→j),t−1 + µ(i→j),t
}
, (i→ j) ∈ {1, ..., Nk(Nk − 1)} (17)
Note that in our setting R˜(i→j) denotes the estimated regret of not playing action (i → j), hence we find
the action with largest R˜.
13: From (17), calculate the probability δ(k)(i→j),t assigned to each pair (i→ j).
14: Given δ(k)(i→j),t, solve the following fixed point equation to find P
(k)
t .
P
(k)
t =
∑
(i→j):i6=j
P
(k),(i→j)
t δ
(k)
(i→j),t. (18)
15: Final probability distribution yields
P
(k)
t = (1− γt)P(k)t +
γt
Nk
. (19)
16: Using the final P(k)t , given by (19), select an action.
17: Play and observe the reward.
18: end for
Algorithm 2 requires the knowledge of the probability assigned to each action by the follow the
perturbed leader strategy at every trial. However, in contrast to NR-BEWAS, these probabilities
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are not assigned explicitly; therefore we explain how to calculate these values.
From (17), the selection probability of virtual action (i → j) ∈ {1, ..., Nk(Nk − 1)} is the
probability that R˜(i→j),t−1 plus perturbation µ(i→j),t is larger than those of other actions, i.e.
Pr[It = (i→ j)]
= Pr[R˜(i→j),t−1 + µ(i→j),t ≥ R˜(i′→j′),t−1 + µ(i′→j′),t ∀(i→ j) 6= (i′ → j′)]
=
∫ ∞
−∞
Pr[R˜(i→j),t−1 + µ(i→j),t = m ∧ R˜(i′→j′),t−1 + µ(i′→j′),t ≤ m ∀(i→ j) 6= (i′ → j′)]dm
=
∫ ∞
−∞
Pr[R˜(i→j),t−1 + µ(i→j),t = m]
∏
(i′→j′) 6=(i→j)
Pr[R˜(i′→j′),t−1 + µ(i′→j′),t ≤ m]dm.
(20)
Since µt is distributed according to a two-sided exponential distribution with width n, the terms
under integral can be calculated easily (see [41], for example). Now we are in a position to show
some properties of NR-BFPLS (Algorithm 2).
Proposition 5. Let t =  =
√
lnn
3
√
Nkn
and γt = γ = min(1, Nkt). Then Algorithm 2 (NR-BFPL)
yields vanishing internal regret with R(k)Int ∈ O((nN2k lnNk)
1
2 ).
Proof: By [40], we know that if the BPFL algorithm is applied to Nk actions, then R
(k)
Ext ∈
O((nNk lnNk)
1
2 ). Using this, the proof proceeds along similar lines as the proof of Proposition
3 and is therefore omitted here.
Corollary 3. Assuming that the game horizon is known and all players play according to NR-
BFPLS, then the minimum required number of trials to achieve -correlated equilibrium yields
maxk=1,...,K 
−2O ((NkK)(N2k lnNk +K
2 lnK)), which is proportional to −2 and increases
polynomially in the number of actions as well as in the number of players.
Proof: The proof is a result of the bound of Proposition 5 and Remark 7.6 of [33].
VI. BANDIT EXPERIMENTAL REGRET-TESTING STRATEGY
Experimental regret-testing belongs to the large family of exhaustive search algorithms, and is
comprehensively discussed in [32] and [33] for bandit games. In this section, we briefly review
this approach, and investigate its performance later in Section VII-A.
First, the time is divided into periods m = 1, 2, ... of length T so that for each m we have
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t ∈ [(m− 1)T + 1,mT ]. At the beginning of period m, any player k randomly selects a mixed
strategy, denoted by P(k)m . Moreover, some random variable U
(m)
k,t ∈ {1, ..., nk, ..., Nk} is defined
as follows. For t ∈ [(m − 1)T + 1,mT ], and for each nk, there are exactly s values of t such
that U (m)k,t = nk, and U
(m)
k,t = 0 for the remaining t = T − sNk trials. At time t, the action I(k)t
is selected to be [38]
I
(k)
t :
is distributed as P(k)m if U
(m)
k,t = 0
equals nk if U
(m)
k,t = nk
. (21)
At the end of period m, player k calculates the experimental regret of playing each action nk
as [38]
rˆ(k)m,nk =
1
T − sNk
mT∑
t=(m−1)T+1
g
(k)
t (It)I{U(m)k,t =0} −
1
s
mT∑
t=(m−1)T+1
g
(k)
t (nk, I
−
t,k)I{U(m)k,t =nk}. (22)
If the regret is smaller than an acceptable threshold ρ, the player continues to play its current
mixed strategy. Otherwise, another mixed strategy is selected. The procedure is summarized in
Algorithm 3. It is known that if the parameters of BERTS (e.g. T and ρ) are chosen appropriately,
then, in a long run, the played mixed strategy profile is an approximate Nash equilibrium for
almost all the time. Details can be found in [33], and hence are omitted.
Algorithm 3 Bandit Experimental Regret Testing Strategy [33] (BERTS)
1: Set T (period length), ρ (acceptable regret threshold), ξ  1 (exploration parameter), m = 1 (period index).
Notice that for each period m = 1, ...,M , we have t ∈ [(m− 1)T + 1,mT ].
2: Select a mixed strategy, P(k)m according to the uniform distribution, from the probability simplex with Nk
dimensions.
3: For each nk ∈ {1, .., Nk} select s exploring trials at random. Exploration trials which are dedicated to different
actions should not overlap.
4: for t = (m− 1)T + y, where 1 ≤ y < T do
5: if t is an exploring trial dedicated to action i then
6: play action i and observe the reward.
7: else
8: select an action using P(k)m . Play and observe the reward.
9: end if
10: end for
11: Calculate the experimental regret of period m, rˆ(k)m,nk , using (22);
12: if max
nk=1,...,Nk
rˆ
(k)
m,nk > ρ, then
13: 1) set m = m+ 1, 2) go to line 2.
14: else
15: • with probability ξ: 1) set m = m+ 1, 2) go to line 2;
• with probability 1− ξ: 1) let P(k)m+1 = P(k)m , 2) set m = m+ 1, 3) go to line 3.
16: end if
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VII. NUMERICAL ANALYSIS
Numerical analysis consists of two parts. In Section VII-A, we consider a simple network,
and clarify the work flow of algorithms. In Section VII-B, we consider a larger network, and
study the performance of the proposed game model and algorithmic solutions in comparison
with some other selection strategies.
A. Part One
1) Network model: The network consists of two transmitter-receiver pairs (users). There exist
two orthogonal channels, C1 and C2, and two power-levels, P1 and P2. Hence, the action
set of each user yields {a1 : (C1, P1), a2 : (C1, P2), a3 : (C2, P1), a4 : (C2, P2)}. The distribu-
tion of channel gains changes at each trial. We assume that the variance of mean values of
these distributions is relatively small, which corresponds to low dynamicity.7 Channel matrices
are H1 =
[0.50, 0.80] [0.15, 0.20]
[0.01, 0.05] [0.01, 0.09]
 and H2 =
[0.02, 0.05] [0.02, 0.06]
[0.05, 0.15] [0.75, 0.95]
, where Hl,(u,v)
(u, v, l ∈ {1, 2}), corresponds to the link u → v through channel l, and presents the interval
from which the mean value of the distribution of channel gain is selected at each trial. Moreover,
we assume P1 = 1, P2 = 5 and α = 10−3. Except for their instantaneous rewards, no other
information is revealed to users. This information can be provided by the receiver feedback
to transmitter. With these settings, it is easy to see that ((C1, P2), (C2, P2)) is the unique pure
strategy Nash equilibrium of this game, i.e. the theoretical convergence point.
2) Results and Discussion: We investigate the performance of selection strategies NR-BEWAS,
NR-BFPLS and BERTS. The following strategies are also considered as benchmark:
• optimal (centralized) action (channel and power level) assignment that is based on global
statistical channel knowledge and is performed by a central unit.
• uniformly random selection.
Figure 1 compares the average reward achieved by NR-BEWAS and NR-BFPLS by those of
random and optimal selections. From the figure, despite being provided with only strictly limited
information, both NR-BFPLS and NR-BEWAS exhibit vanishing regret, in the sense that the
achieved average reward converges to that of centralized scenario.
7Note that this assumption is made in order to simplify the implementation; as established theoretically, all proposed procedures
converge to equilibrium for arbitrary varying distributions.
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Fig. 1. Performance of four selection strategies. Both NR-BEWAS and NR-BFPLS exhibit vanishing regret; that is, their
average rewards converge to that of optimal (centralized) selection.
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Fig. 2. Evolution of the mixed strategy of User 1, applying NR-BEWAS. Horizontal axis denotes the action indices, where index
i, i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}, stands for action ai. Vertical axis shows the weight of each action in the mixed strategy, i.e. its probability
of being selected. The mixed strategy of User 1 converges to pi1 = (0, 1, 0, 0).
Figures 2 and 3 illustrate the evolution of mixed strategies of the two users when NR-BEWAS
is used. Figures 4 and 5, on the other hand, show the same variable when actions are selected by
using NR-BFPLS. For both cases, the first and second users respectively converge to a2 : (C1, P2)
and a4 : (C2, P2), as suggested by the theory.
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Fig. 3. Evolution of the mixed strategy of User 2, applying NR-BEWAS. The horizontal and vertical axes respectively depict
the indices of actions and their selection probabilities. The mixed strategy of User 2 converges to pi2 = (0, 0, 0, 1).
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Fig. 4. Evolution of the mixed strategy of User 1, applying NR-BFPLS. The horizontal and vertical axes respectively depict
the indices of actions and their selection probabilities. The mixed strategy of User 1 converges to pi1 = (0, 1, 0, 0).
The performance of BERTS, however, is not an explicit function of game duration. As
described before, the procedure continues to search mixed strategies until a suitable one, which
yields a regret less than the selected threshold, is captured. Then this strategy is played for the
rest of the game. Theorem 7.8 of [33] specifies the minimum game duration to guarantee the
convergence of BERTS, which is relatively long even for small number of users and actions.
Nevertheless, similar to other search-based algorithms, there also exists the possibility of finding
some acceptable strategy at early stages of the game. As a result, for relatively short games, the
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Fig. 5. Evolution of the mixed strategy of User 2, applying NR-BFPLS. The horizontal and vertical axes respectively depict
the indices of actions and their selection probabilities. The mixed strategy of User 2 converges to pi2 = (0, 0, 0, 1).
performance of BERTS is rather unpredictable. The other issue is the effect of regret threshold.
On the one hand, larger threshold reduces the search time, since the set of acceptable strategies is
large. On the other hand, large regret threshold might lead to performance loss, since there is the
possibility that the user gets locked at some sub-optimal strategy at early stages, thereby incurring
large accumulated regret. It is worth noting that due to its simplicity, and despite unpredictable
performance, BERTS is an appealing approach in cases where computational effort should be
minimized, and convergence to Nash equilibrium is desired. Figure 6 summarizes the results of
few exemplary performances of BERTS. The parameters are selected as T = 80, M = 1500
and ρ = 0.16 (see Section VI). Simulation is performed for six independent rounds. The curve
on the left side of Figure 6 depicts the period (1 ≤ m ≤ 1500) at which the algorithm finds
an acceptable strategy. As expected, the results exhibit no specific pattern. The four sub-figures
on the right depict the mixed strategies selected by BERTS at rounds 1 and 2, together with
average rewards. From this figure, at round 2, acceptable strategies are found earlier than round
1 by both users, leading to better average performance. It is also worth noting that for User 2,
the strategy of round 1 is in essence better than that of round 2; nevertheless, it is found later.
As a result, the average performance of round 2 is superior to that of round 1.
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Fig. 6. Performance of BERTS. On the left, the vertical and horizontal axes show the periods and round number, respectively.
The two curves depict the period at which a suitable mixed strategy (MS) is found at each of the 6 rounds. On the right, these
mixed strategies are shown for both users at rounds 1 and 2, together with average rewards. The horizontal and vertical axes
respectively depict the indices of actions and their selection probabilities.
B. Part Two
In this section we consider a wireless network consisting of 5 users (transmitter-receiver pairs),
that compete for access to three orthogonal channels at two possible power levels (hence six
actions). We compare BFPLS and BEWAS with the following selection approaches.8
• Optimal (centralized) action assignment as described in Section VII-A2.
• Centralized no-collision action selection, where no reward is assigned to users that access
the same channel. Thus, users are encouraged to avoid collisions (a collision-avoidance
8As mentioned before, observing the joint action profile and/or communication among users is not required for implementing
BEWAS, BFPLS and BERTS. Therefore, they cannot be compared with strategies that include mutual observation and/or
communication. A good example of such algorithms is the widely-used best-response dynamics, where the strategy of each
player is to play with the best-response to either the historical [10] or the predicted [5] joint action profile of opponents. Another
example is the strategy suggested in [20], which is a combination of learning and auction algorithms where users communicate
with each other.
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Fig. 7. Aggregate average reward of BFPLS and BEWAS compared to some other selection strategies.
strategy). This curve can be considered as an upper-bound for the performance of learning
algorithms that select actions based on collision avoidance, such as [20].
• -greedy algorithm, where at each trial, with probability  (exploration parameter), an
action is selected uniformly at random, while with probability 1 −  the best action so
far is played. The average reward of selected action is updated after each play [42]. For
stationary environments,  is usually time-varying and converges to zero in the limit, while
in adversarial cases,  is preferred to remain fixed. Here we let  = 0.1.
• Greedy approach, where at the beginning of the game, some trials are reserved for explo-
ration, in which actions are selected at random (exploration period). The length of this period
is a pre-defined fraction of the entire game duration. Based on the rewards of exploration
period, the best possible action is selected, and is played for the rest of the game (exploitation
period) [33]. This approach is extremely simple to implement; however, to the best of our
knowledge, there is no analysis on the optimal length of the exploration period.
• Uniformly random selection.
The numerical results are depicted in Figure 7. From this figure, we can conclude the following.
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• The performance of interference-avoidance strategies is strongly influenced by channel
matrices and tends to be poor specifically when the number of channels is less than that of
users. The reason is that the sum reward of multiple interfering users with limited transmit
power might be larger than the maximum achievable reward of any single user.
• The performance of both BFPLS and BEWAS converge to that of centralized approach. As
expected, BFPLS converges faster than BEWAS and we point out that the convergence speed
of both algorithms would be dramatically enhanced if some side information was available
to players, e.g. if users observed the actions of each other, or if communication was allowed
among players. It is also worth noting that although BFPLS converges faster than BEWAS,
the computation of integral (20) might be involved, especially for large number of actions
[41].
• In general, -greedy and greedy approaches can be implemented easily with low com-
putational cost; nevertheless, it can be seen that the greedy approaches are inferior to
BEWAS and BFPLS in terms of asymptotic performance. Basically, these approaches are
more suitable for stationary environments.
VIII. CONCLUSION AND REMARKS
This paper deals with resource allocation in multi-user infrastructureless wireless networks.
The problem of utility maximization has been formulated using the multi-player multi-armed
bandit theory framework. More precisely, given no side information, the users aim at minimizing
some regret expressed in terms of the loss of reward by selecting appropriate actions on a
given space of transmit power levels and orthogonal frequency channels. Based on some recent
mathematical results, we have designed two selection strategies, which not only provide vanishing
regret for each player, but also guarantee the asymptotic convergence of the game to the set of
correlated equilibria. We have also studied experimental regret testing strategy that asymptotically
converges to the set of Nash equilibria. Numerical results confirms the applicability of the game
model and proposed strategies to wireless channel selection and power control.
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IX. APPENDIX
A. Some Auxiliary Results
In this section, we state some auxiliary results and materials from game theory as well as
bandit theory that are necessary for proofs.
1) Game Theory: Throughout this part, we consider a game G consisting of a set of K players
where the strategy set of each player k ∈ {1, ..., K} is denoted by I(k) with a generic element
i(k) = (i
(k)
1 , ..., i
(k)
M ). Similarly, the set of joint strategy profiles of players is denoted by I with a
generic element i = (i(1), ..., i(K)) and i−k stands for the joint action profile of all players except
for player k. Moreover, g(k)(i) stands for the utility function of some player k.9
Definition 4. A game G is smooth if, for each k ∈ {1, ..., K}, g(k)(i) has continuous partial
derivatives with respect to the components of i(k).
Definition 5. Let Og(k) =
(
∂g(k)
∂i
(k)
1
, · · · , ∂g(k)
∂i
(k)
M
)
, and call
(
Og(k)
)
k∈{1,...,K} the payoff gradient of
a smooth game G. We say that the payoff gradient is strictly monotone if
K∑
k=1
(
Og(k)(i)− Og(k)(j))T (i(k) − j(k)) < 0, (23)
holds for all i, j ∈ I with i 6= j.
Theorem 2 ( [43]). Consider a smooth game G with compact strategy sets. If the payoff gradient
of G is strictly monotone then it has a unique correlated equilibrium, which places probability
one on a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium.
Definition 6. A game G is potential if there exists a potential function f : I→ < such that
g(k)(i, i−k )− g(k)(j, i−k ) = f(i, i−k )− f(j, i−k ), (24)
for all i, j ∈ I(k) and k ∈ {1, ..., K}.
Theorem 3 ( [44]). Let G be a smooth potential game with a strictly concave potential function.
Then a strategy profile is the unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium if and only if it is the potential
maximizer.
9Note that compared to the system model some notation has been changed slightly.
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Lemma 1 ( [43]). Let G be a smooth potential game. A potential of G is strictly concave if and
only if the payoff gradient of G is strictly monotone.
2) Bandit Theory:
Lemma 2. Let Rn and RExt be given by (1) and (2), respectively. Then, for any δ ∈ (0, 12 ], we
have10
Pr
(
|Rn −RExt| ≤
√
n
2
ln
1
δ
)
≥ 1− 2δ, (25)
from which it follows that if Rn ∈ o(n), then we have RExt ∈ o(n), with arbitrarily high
probability.11
Proof: By comparing (1) and (2), it suffices to show that Pr (|∑nt=1 (gt(It)− g¯t(Pt))|) ≤√
n
2
ln 1
δ
≤ 1 − 2δ. To this end, define S := ∑nt=1 gt(It), where gt(It) ∈ [0, 1], 1 ≤ t ≤ n, are
independent random variables (see also Section II-A). Further note that S¯ = E[S] =
∑n
t=1 g¯t(Pt).
Therefore, by Hoeffding’s inequality [33],
Pr
(
|Rn −RExt| ≥
√
n
2
ln
1
δ
)
=Pr
(∣∣S − S¯∣∣ ≥√n
2
ln
1
δ
)
≤2 exp
(
−2
n
2
ln 1
δ
n
)
= 2δ.
(26)
Hence the Lemma follows with Pr
(
|Rn −RExt| ≤
√
n
2
ln 1
δ
)
= 1−Pr
(
|Rn −RExt| ≥
√
n
2
ln 1
δ
)
.
Lemma 3. Let RExt be given by (2). Moreover, define R˜n = maxi=1,...,N
∑n
t=1 gt(i)−
∑n
t=1 g˜t (Pt),
where g˜t (Pt) =
∑N
i=1 pi,tg˜t(i) and g˜t(i) is given by (12). Then we have
Pr
(∣∣∣R˜n −RExt∣∣∣ ≤√n
2
ln
1
δ
)
≥ 1− 2δ. (27)
Hence, for sufficiently small δ > 0, RExt ∈ o(n) implies that R˜n ∈ o(n), with arbitrarily high
probability.
10Throughout this section and in order to simplify the notation, the player index (k) is omitted unless ambiguity arises.
11Here and hereafter, the statement ”X(n) ∈ o(n) with arbitrarily high probability” for some nonnegative random sequence
X(n) ∈ R means that the probability of X(n) /∈ o(n) can be made arbitrarily small, provided that some parameter is chosen
sufficiently small.
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Proof: Similar to the proof of Lemma 2, it follows from (2) and the definition of R˜n that it
is sufficient to show that Pr
(
|∑nt=1 (g˜t(Pt)− g¯t(Pt))| ≤√n2 ln 1δ) ≤ 1 − 2δ for δ ∈ (0, 12 ]. To
this end, note that g˜t(Pt) ∈ [0, 1], 1 ≤ t ≤ n, are independent random variables. Moreover, since
g˜t(i) is an unbiased estimate of gt(i), we have E[
∑n
t=1 g˜t(Pt)] =
∑n
t=1 g¯t(Pt). Hence, defining
S = g¯t(Pt)− g˜t(Pt) and proceeding as in the proof of Lemma 2 with the Hoeffding’s inequality
in hand proves the lemma.
Proposition 6. Let Rn be given by (1) and R˜n be defined as in Lemma 3. Then, Rn ∈ o(n)
implies thatR˜n ∈ o(n).
Proof: Lemma 2 implies that Rn ∈ o(n) ⇒ RExt ∈ o(n) with arbitrarily high probability,
while by Lemma 3, we have RExt ∈ o(n)⇒ R˜ ∈ o(n). Therefore, if Rn ∈ o(n), then R˜ ∈ o(n)
with arbitrarily high probability.
Theorem 4. ( [33]) Let Φ(U) = ψ(
∑N
i=1 φ(ui)), where U = (u1, ..., uN). Consider a selection
strategy, which at time t selects action It according to distribution Pt, whose elements pi,t are
defined as
pi,t = (1− γt) φ
′(Ri,t−1)∑N
k=1 φ
′(Ri,t−1)
+
γt
N
, (28)
where Ri,t−1 =
∑t−1
s=1 (gs(i)− gs(Is)). Assume that:
A1.
∑n
t=1
1
γ2t
= o( n
2
lnn
),
A2. For all vectors Vt = (v1,t, ..., vn,t) with |vi,t| ≤ Nγt , we have
lim
n→∞
1
ψ(φ(n))
n∑
t=1
C(Vt) = 0, (29)
where C(Vt) = supU∈RN ψ
′(
∑N
i=1 φ(ui))
∑N
i=1 φ
′′(ui)v2i,t.
A3. For all vectors Ut = (u1,t, ..., un,t), with ui,t ≤ t,
lim
n→∞
1
ψ(φ(n))
n∑
t=1
γt
N∑
i=1
OiΦ(Ut) = 0. (30)
A4. For all vectors Ut = (u1,t, ..., un,t), with ui,t ≤ t,
lim
n→∞
lnn
ψ(φ(n))
√√√√ n∑
t=1
1
γ2t
(
N∑
i=1
OiΦ(Ut)
)2
. (31)
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Then the selection strategy satisfies
lim
n→∞
1
n
(
max
i=1,...,N
n∑
t=1
gt(i)−
n∑
t=1
gt(It)
)
= 0, (32)
or equivalently, Rn ∈ o(n), where Rn is given by (1).
B. Proof of Proposition 1
In order to prove Proposition 1, we use Theorem 2. As the strategy set is compact, in order
to use this theorem, we show that 1) the game is smooth, and 2) the payoff gradient is strictly
monotone.
According to our system model, by changing the channel index, c(k), the channel gain and
interference changes. Therefore we define i(k)1 :=
|h
kk′,c(k) |2∑Qk
q=1 l
(q)|h
qk′,c(k) |2+N0
and i(k)2 := l
(k), from
which we have g(k)(i) = log
(
i
(k)
1 i
(k)
2
)− αi(k)2 . This results in
∂g(k)
∂i
(k)
1
=
1
i
(k)
1
. (33)
and
∂g(k)
∂i
(k)
2
=
1
i
(k)
2
− α. (34)
Hence by Definition 4, the game is smooth. On the other hand, given g(k), we have(
Og(k)(i)− Og(k)(j))T (i(k) − j(k))
=
[
1
i
(k)
1
− 1
j
(k)
1
1
i
(k)
2
− 1
j
(k)
2
]i(k)1 − j(k)1
i
(k)
2 − j(k)2

=
(
1
i
(k)
1
− 1
j
(k)
1
)
(i
(k)
1 − j(k)1 ) +
(
1
i
(k)
2
− 1
j
(k)
2
)
(i
(k)
2 − j(k)2 ),
(35)
which is always negative as for any x, y > 0 and x 6= y, x− y > 0 yields 1
x
− 1
y
< 0 and vice
versa. So,
K∑
k=1
Og(k) < 0 (36)
i.e. the payoff gradient is strictly monotone by Definition 5.
As a result, by Theorem 2, the game has a unique correlated equilibrium which places
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probability one on the unique Nash equilibrium.
C. Proof of Proposition 2
First, we point out that the game is a potential game with a potential function being f(·) =∑K
k=1 g
(k)(·), by simply inserting g(k) and f in condition (24). Moreover, similar to Proposition
1, it can be easily shown that the game is smooth and the payoff gradient is strictly monotone
(Define i(k)1 :=
|hc(k)|2
N0
and i(k)2 = l
(k)).12 Therefore, by Lemma 1, the game is a smooth potential
game with strictly concave potential function. As a result, by Theorem 3, it has a unique pure
strategy Nash equilibrium which is the potential maximizer. On the other hand, by Lemma 2,
the game has a unique correlated equilibrium which places probability one on the unique pure
strategy Nash equilibrium.
D. Proof of Proposition 3
We first notice that RExt ∈ O((nN) 23 (lnN) 13 ), as stated by the following lemma.13
Lemma 4. Consider a selection strategy that uses Pt = (p1,t, ..., pN,t) to select an action among
N possible choices, where pi,t is calculated as
pi,t = (1− γ) exp(ηR˜i,t−1)∑
m=1,..,N exp(ηR˜m,t−1)
+
γ
N
, (37)
and R˜i,t−1 denotes the estimated accumulated regret of not playing action i.14 Then selecting γ
and η as given by Proposition 3 yields RExt ∈ O((nN) 23 (lnN) 13 ).
Proof: The proof is a direct corollary of Theorem 6.6 of [33].
Given Lemma 4, we follow the approach of [34] for the rest of the proof.
Recall that by Section II-C and Algorithm 1, the mixed strategy of each player is defined by
Pt =
∑
(i→j):i 6=j
P
(i→j)
t δ(i→j),t. (38)
12Details are similar to Proposition 1 and thus are omitted.
13Throughout this section and in order to simplify the notation, the player index (k) is omitted unless ambiguity arises.
14This definition should not be mistaken for the general regret defined in Section II-A.
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Hence,
g¯t(Pt) =
∑
(i→j):i 6=j
g¯t(P
(i→j)
t )δ(i→j),t. (39)
Lemma 4 specifies the growth rate of external regret. On the other hand, as described in Section
II-C, the convergence approach applies the BEWAS algorithm for N(N − 1) ≤ N2 actions.
Therefore, (39) together with Lemma 4 yields
max
n∑
t=1
g¯t(P
(i→j)
t )−
n∑
t=1
g¯t(Pt) ∈ O((N2n) 23 (2 lnN) 13 ), (40)
and the definition of internal regret ensures that maxi 6=j R(i→j),n ∈ O((N2n) 23 (lnN) 13 ), which
concludes the proof. Details can be found in [34], and hence are omitted.
E. Proof of Proposition 4
We first show that the algorithm has vanishing external regret, i.e. RExt ∈ o(n), as formalized
in the following.
Lemma 5. Consider a selection strategy that uses Pt = (p1,t, ..., pN,t) to select an action among
N possible choices, where pi,t is calculated as
pi,t = (1− γt) exp(ηtR˜i,t−1)∑
m=1,..,N exp(ηtR˜m,t−1)
+
γt
N
, (41)
and R˜i,t−1 denotes the estimated accumulated regret of not playing action i. Then, for γt and ηt
as given by Proposition 4, this strategy yields vanishing external regret, i.e. RExt ∈ o(n).
Proof: By Proposition 6, if (32) is satisfied for a selection strategy (that is, if Rn ∈ o(n)),
then the growth rate of the external regret caused by the bandit version of that strategy (which
uses estimated rewards instead of true ones) grows sublinearly in n, i.e. R˜n ∈ o(n). Therefore, in
order to prove the proposition, we can show that our selected parameters γt = t−
1
3 and ηt =
γ3t
N2
satisfy axioms A1-A4 of Theorem 4. In what follows, we show that each of these axioms is
fulfilled. In doing so, we omit for the lack of space simple calculus steps. Also the reader should
note that in our strategy we have Φ(U) = 1
ηt
ln
(∑N
i=1 exp(ηtui)
)
.
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A1. For γt = t−
1
3 , we have
n∑
t=1
1
γ2t
=
n∑
t=1
t
2
3 = Harmonic Number[n,−2
3
] := Hn[
−2
3
]. (42)
Then,
lim
n→∞
lnn
n2
n∑
t=1
γ2t = lim
n→∞
lnn
n2
Hn[
−2
3
] = 0. (43)
A2. For ψ(x) = 1
ηt
lnx and φ(x) = exp(ηtx), we obtain
C(Vt) = sup
(
ηt
N∑
i=1
v2i,t
)
=
ηtN
3
γ2t
. (44)
Hence,
lim
n→∞
1
ψ(φ(n))
n∑
t=1
C(Vt) = lim
n→∞
1
n
n∑
t=1
t
−1
3
= lim
n→∞
1
n
Hn[
1
3
] =0.
(45)
A3. For Φ(U) = 1
ηt
ln
(∑N
i=1 exp(ηtui)
)
, OiΦ(Ut) yields
OiΦ(Ut) =
exp(ηtui)∑N
i=1 exp(ηtui)
. (46)
Therefore,
lim
n→∞
1
ψ(φ(n))
n∑
t=1
γt
N∑
i=1
OiΦ(Ut) =
lim
n→∞
1
n
n∑
t=1
t
−1
3
N∑
i=1
exp(ηtui)∑N
i=1 exp(ηtui)
=
lim
n→∞
1
n
Hn[
1
3
] = 0.
(47)
A4. A4 follows simply by substituting (46) in (31).
Hence, all axioms A1-A4 are satisfied, and therefore (32) holds, which, together with Propo-
sition 6, completes the proof.
By Lemma 5, the external regret BEWAS grows sublinearly in n. Therefore, similar to the
proof of Proposition 3, (39) yields
max
n∑
t=1
g¯t(P
(i→j)
t )−
n∑
t=1
g¯t(Pt) ∈ o(n), (48)
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and the definition of internal regret ensures that maxi 6=j R(i→j),n ∈ o(n), which concludes the
proof.
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